Introduction
Long-term unemployment is still a huge problem in Germany (e.g. OECD 2006) . Policies aimed at increasing the chances of reintegration of long-term unemployed persons thus deserve special attention. In a recent meta-study, Kluve (2006) concludes that it is mostly the programme type that matters for effectiveness; in particular, wage subsidies, services and sanctions seem to work. However, there are considerable differences in the design of wage subsidies.
General wage subsidies are paid permanently for all low-wage earners in an economy, regardless of their employment history. Their obverse are negative payroll taxes for employees, which have been a major vehicle used by many governments to stimulate employment. Marginal wage subsidies concern only a firm's additional employment exceeding some reference level (Knabe et al. 2006) . Targeted wage subsidies -or hiring subsidies (Orszag/Snower 2003) -are tailored to particular groups of unemployed and usually granted for a limited time period. In the following, wage subsidies are considered to be payments to employers (Fay 1996) .
This paper analyses the effectiveness of a targeted wage subsidy programme, covering a share of labour costs and paid to employers for a fixed period of time. We ask if taking up a subsidized job during the second quarter of 2002 has improved the employment prospects of participating hard-to-place workers in Germany. The programme will be described in detail in Section 2, which also discusses recent results from the literature. Section 3 presents the evaluation strategy and describes data and variables. The empirical results are depicted in Section 4. In Section 5 we draw a summary of the results and discuss their implications. A main feature of our analysis is that we extend the usual approach of estimating the effect of taking up subsidized employment compared to remaining unemployed: We also estimate the effect of receiving a subsidy on employment and unemployment rates conditional on taking up a job and conditional on having participated in a short-term training measure beforehand.
Wage subsidies are a policy that tries to affect employment via the wage rate (Hamermesh 1993 , Chapter 5): They obviously reduce labour costs of a given employee for a firm. The sub- sidy can compensate the firm for a gap between a worker's productivity and his minimum wage. A temporary subsidy might have long-run positive effects on individual labour market prospects if employees are able to close the gap over time by learning on-the-job. Also, a period of subsidization might be necessary to reduce an employer's uncertainty about the employability of job applicants and might thus serve as a screening advice.
But wage subsidies for the unemployed are also often criticized (Layard et al. 1991, Chapter 10) : First, several of those subsidised would have been recruited anyway, thus a deadweight loss occurs (see also Welters/Muysken 2006) . Second, some of those recruited will merely replace others, thus the subsidy does only achieve preferential treatment for some and a substitution effect occurs. Third, if subsidies produce an increase in employment in some firms, this might be at the expense of jobs in other firms, thus the only effect is displacement. These effects cannot be identified by our research approach. A fourth argument against employer-based subsidies -in particular vouchers handed out to the unemployed -are potential stigma effects (Burtless 1985 , Bell et al. 1999 . A counterargument in favour of wage subsides is made by Fay (1996) . He makes the point that substitution effects may not be seen as detrimental from a policy perspective, since targeted subsidy schemes are intended to "shuffle the queue" of jobseekers. Thus, targeting should lead to preferential hiring of otherwise disadvantaged workers.
Programme features and empirical evidence 2.1 Characteristics and importance of the programme
Targeted wage subsidies to employers represent a standard instrument in the bundle of active labour market policies in Germany. For a long time, training programmes (see for instance Fitzenberger/Speckesser 2007) and job creation in the public sector (see for instance Caliendo et al. 2008) used to be the largest programmes in Germany. Wage subsidies gained importance first in East Germany during the economic restructuring following the reunification and thereafter again in the late nineties. The programme we are dealing with is one of three variants of a wage subsidy to employerscalled "Eingliederungszuschuss" (EGZ) -that were in place during the period 1998 to 2003.
We concentrate on the variant for hard-to-place workers ("EGZ bei erschwerter Vermittlung"), whose target group were unemployed with severe problems of reintegration, like e.g. long-term unemployed or disabled persons. Of the other two variants, one was granted for special training requirements, while the other was targeted at workers of age 50 and older (in Germany unemployment rates are high and reemployment-chances are low for the over 50s The decision to support an unemployed with an EGZ has to be reasoned in each individual case. Case managers in local employment agencies have latitude in the allowance decision as well as in the fixing of the amount and duration of the subsidy. The EGZ for hard-to-place persons could regularly account for as much as 50 percent of the monthly wage or salary and continue for at most 12 months. These limits could be exceeded in exceptional cases. As a special feature of the EGZ, a follow-up period of further employment is obligatory after the expiration of the subsidy. If a person hired with an EGZ is dismissed within this period for reasons attributable to the employer, the employer can be asked to reimburse part of the subsidy. Forslund et al. (2004) analysed the effectiveness of a targeted, time-limited wage subsidy scheme in Sweden. The scheme under consideration was implemented in 1998 and granted up to 50 percent of wages for a maximum of six months to firms who recruited long-term unemployed. Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) applied nonparamet- 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Few studies are based on social experiments, where treatment is allocated randomly among the unemployed (Burtless 1985) , or on natural experiments, which utilize changes in legislation and apply difference-in-differences estimators to the treated group and a similar group that is unaffected by the changes (Boockmann et al. 2007 ). Burtless (1985) presented the results from an early social experiment of the effectiveness of targeted wage subsidies that was conducted in
Selected review of the literature
Ohio during the years 1980 to 1981. Some of the job seekers were given vouchers identifying them to employers as eligible for a tax credit or for a direct cash rebate. The subsidy amounted to 50 percent of wages during the first year and 25 percent of wages during the second year of employment, up to a threshold. Burtless showed that unemployed persons with a voucher were and the comparison group (comprised of slightly younger workers). Significant effects of the changes in conditions were found only for the subgroup of female workers in East Germany.
The authors concluded that increases in subsidised employment for all other groups investigated are absorbed by deadweight losses. However, only a comparatively small percentage of individuals in the age groups investigated actually received the subsidy, and changes in legislation affected mainly the duration of the subsidy.
Finally, a comparison of subsidised and non-subsidised individuals taking-up a job has been conducted by Cockx et al. (1998) . They analysed temporary wage subsidies that have been paid to employers in Belgium during 1991 and 1992. The subsidy was granted for 12 to 24 months and covered 10 to 50 percent of the wage rate; it was often targeted at particular groups. The authors utilized data from firms on their last five recruitments and estimate a duration model.
They found positive, but insignificant effects of the subsidy on job tenure. In the already mentioned study for the State of Wisconsin, Hamersma (2005) also estimated the effect of a subsidy on wages and tenure of subsidized workers, using propensity score matching. She found significantly positive effects on wages in the subsidized job (around 40 percent of the tax credit were passed through to workers in the form of a wage premium), but insignificant effects on tenure.
Summing up, a number of studies based on non-experimental data obtain the result that targeted wage subsidies improve the labour market chances of the unemployed. The few findings from social and natural experiments are more ambiguous. Across countries, there are large differences in programme sizes as well as in the amount and duration of wage subsidies. Furthermore, the implementation of programmes differs across countries. Finally, the institutional framework -for instance replacement rates and the importance of activation strategies -will also have an impact on the success of a labour market programme.
3
Evaluation approach, data and variables
The estimands of interest
We are interested in the mean effect of taking up subsidized employment during the second quarter of 2002 on the consecutive unemployment and employment rates of participants. The fundamental evaluation problem is caused by the fact that participants in labour market programmes will sort themselves or will be sorted into programmes on the basis of their current as well as of their expected labour market prospects. In the absence of an experimental design, the challenge is to find a very similar group of non-participating individuals, whose outcomes can be interpreted as counterfactual outcomes of the group of participants. We estimate these counterfactual outcomes using statistical matching techniques. Appendix A gives a formal definition of the estimated parameter and explains the applied method.
An important topic is the choice of the classification window in time, which defines participation and non-participation in a labour market programme. Following Sianesi (2004 Sianesi ( , 2008 , our comparison state is either no participation at all or participation within a period of three years after the start of the subsidy. Consequently, our estimands display the effect of taking up a subsidized job during the second quarter of 2002, compared to no or latter participation in a labour A novel feature of our analysis is that we estimate three different counterfactuals for persons entering wage subsidy programmes:
1) The effect of taking up a subsidised job versus remaining unemployed.
2) The effect of taking up a subsidised job versus taking up non-subsidised employment.
3) The effect of taking up a subsidised job after a short period of on-the-job training versus participation in on-the-job training only.
The first scenario assumes that -conditional on the observed characteristics of unemployed persons -access to the wage subsidy is random. However, to place an unemployed person on a subsidized job, an employer must agree to hire her or him. Accordingly, the fact that a person has been able to get a subsidised job may as such be a hint on unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, unobserved heterogeneity will be strongly correlated with the observed explaining variables; this should hold particularly for information on an individual's labour market history (Heckman et. al 1999) . As we have detailed information on previous employment histories, this should capture most of the effects of unobserved individual factors. Employer characteristics may be another source of unobserved heterogeneity. Previous studies for Germany indeed find that factors like firm size, industry, sales and previous experiences with wage subsidies have an influence on the probability that firms make use of wage subsidies (Hartmann 2004 , Jaenichen 1999 ). More recently, there is some evidence that average wages and the size of firms may influence the success of wage subsidies (Krug et al. 2008) . Unfortunately, our data are lacking information on employers. The third scenario is suggested by the observation that subsidized employment is often preceded by a short-term firm-related training measure ("betriebliche Trainingsmaßnahme"). The question we ask is, whether there is an additional advantage of an EGZ in this situation. On the one hand, if short-term training serves as a filter for employment, only workers showing a sufficiently high performance during their training period will be offered a subsidised job. On the other hand, employers who are informed about the "true" productivity after the training period may have better arguments to bargain for a further period of subsidised employment. In this case, workers with combined participation of training and EGZ would be those who really need an integration subsidy.
Data and variables
We utilize administrative data collected and provided by the German Federal Employment Agency. The combination of information on programme episodes and on employment episodes allows us to distinguish between times in subsidised employment (through a wage subsidy or in a public job creation measure) and regular employment. Since the data flows integrated in the IEB stem from different sources, we had to correct several inconsistencies. Our analysis distinguishes between several subgroups of participants. First, all analyses were conducted separately by gender and region (West vs. East Germany). Furthermore, we distinguish short-term subsidies with duration of four to six months from long-term subsidies lasting from seven to twelve months. Because of small case-loads for short-term subsidies, the impact of the EGZ in the third scenario is only estimated for long-term subsidies. Since own estimates (ZEW et al. 2006) showed no systematic differences across groups with different durations of unemployment, we do not present results for samples stratified by unemployment duration.
We consider two binary outcome variables to describe the labour market status. Our first outcome variable indicates whether an individual is in unsubsidised employment at the beginning As we have already discussed in detail in Section 3.1, we are confident that unobserved individual heterogeneity should not be a major problem for our analysis. Common support (see Appendix A) is achieved for all treated individuals in our sample. The validity of the stable unit treatment value assumption (see also Appendix A) depends mainly on the size of the programme. A large-scale programme can be expected to change the supply and demand conditions in some segment of the labour market or the labour market as a whole. While (especially in East Germany) the use of wage subsidies has been very intensive in some periods, the importance of subsidized employment compared to regular employment in the period of our study is fairly limited. As Table B .2 shows, the most frequent transition out of unemployment is still 
Empirical results

Effect of a subsidy on the treated
In the first scenario, we estimate the average effect of the EGZ on the employment prospects of previously unemployed persons. The counterfactuals are employment and unemployment rates when participating never or only later in a labour market programme. Table 1 displays in Panel IV mean standardized biases before and after matching. The bias reduction obtained through the matching procedure is on average slightly less than 80 percent, while the absolute value of the mean standardized bias after matching never exceeds the value of 5. Due to these results the quality of the matching seems quite satisfactory.
Panel I and II of Table 1 summarize the results three years after programme start, documenting the share of treated and of matched control persons in regular unsubsidised employment, the share that is not unemployed (or in a labour market measure) as well as average treatment effects on the treated. The evolution of the estimated average treatment effects over time is displayed in Figure 1 . Plots above the abscissa have to been interpreted as a "success" of the particular programme. Figure 1 shows for the period of subsidization and for the compulsory period of further employment that treated individuals were less often in unsubsidised employment and have less often avoided unemployment. These locking-in effects are a necessary side-effect of the construction of the outcome variables. We find large and significant positive effects of the treatment on the treated immediately after the end of the support by the programme, which, however, decline slightly over time.
Three years after the start of subsidization, the share in "regular unsubsidised employment" is still 0.25 to 0.42 higher in the treated group than in the matched comparison group. In other Table 1 ). This implies that a higher percentage of untreated individuals withdraw from the labour market as discouraged workers. Thus the subsidies help to activate hard-to-place individuals, who might otherwise have withdrawn from the labour market.
Comparisons of estimates of the treatment effect between the different groups investigated must be interpreted with caution, since characteristics of group members differ for each group (see Table 1 ). Nonetheless, some results should be mentioned:
• Across comparison groups, the average outcome "unsubsidised employment" (Panel I of Table 1 ) does not differ remarkably by gender or region, but is slightly smaller for the longterm subsidy. However, across treated groups the grant of an EGZ seems to have had a particularly large effect on employment opportunities of female workers, which was even stronger in East Germany. Accordingly, estimated treatment effects are much higher for female than for male workers.
• For the outcome "not unemployed and not in measure" (Panel II of Table 1 ), we observe a striking result for the matched control sample of females from West Germany -they are less often unemployed than females from East Germany or males. An obvious explanation is that housework has always been a rather accepted alternative for women in West Germany, which facilitates withdrawing from the labour market. In contrast, women in East Germany are much more attached to the labour market. This is partly a result of the generally higher we are indebted to a referee for pointing this out). Looking at the treatment groups, the outcome is again more advantageous for female workers. The net result is that the estimated treatment effect is highest for the group of females in East Germany and does not differ much among the other groups.
• Comparing the recipients of short-term and long-term EGZ, labour market outcomes are always more favourable for treated individuals who received a short EGZ as well as for their matched control persons. This is not surprising, since the duration of the subsidy should be a function of placement difficulties. However, estimated average treatment effects are rather similar for short-and long-term subsidies at each point of time after the employment promotion had expired (Figure 1) .
A deadweight loss in a narrower sense only occurs when the same individual would have got the same job without the help of the EGZ. Data and technique applied do not provide a measure for this effect. Some studies for other labour market measures interpret the share of the matched comparison group that has successfully found an unsubsidised job as a measure of the deadweight loss in a wider sense (Winterhager et al. 2006, 513) . In this sense, the deadweight accompanying EGZ would be around 20 percentage points (Panel I of Table 1 ).
Effect of a subsidy conditional on taking up a job
The previous estimates referred to the combined effect of receiving a subsidy and taking a job, while the second scenario investigates solely the effect of the subsidy, conditional on having found a -subsidised or unsubsidised -job. The results of the estimates can be found in Table 2 and Figure 2 (note that only significant effects are displayed in the figures). The information on the mean standardized bias in Panel IV of Table 2 indicates again a satisfactory matching quality, with a mean bias reduction of more than 80 percent through the matching procedure. Figure 2 shows clearly the initial lock-in effect of subsidization. However, after the subsidy and the obligation period have expired, the average treatment effect is rather small, follows no obvious trend and is very similar for short-term and long-term subsidies: Three years after the subsidy started, the effect is insignificant for all groups except for female workers in East Germany, which fare slightly better, if they have started in a subsidised employment relationship (Panel I and II of Table 2 ). Estimated treatment effects do not differ remarkably between both outcome variables; around 10 percentage points of the treatment group as well as of the matched control sample "vanish" into an unobserved labour market state.
In choosing the members of the matched comparison group, we focus on their labour market success -finding an unsubsidised job. We control for a number of observable characteristics of workers, which should also account at least partly for unobserved characteristics (see Section 3.2). However, the matched comparison group will differ from the treated group at least regard- 
Effect of a subsidy conditional on participation in a short training measure
In the last scenario, we estimate the average effect of the EGZ on supported individuals conditional on having participated in a firm-related short-term training measure beforehand. The analysis thus hinges on having gained at least some work experience within a firm during the last quarter. However, we cannot distinguish between situations, where employers have already filtered the more suited candidates for a subsidised job from training participants, and situations, where employers claim the subsidy because a worker's lower productivity has become visible during the training period. Table 3 and Figure 3 display the main results. The mean standardized bias (Panel IV of Table   3 ) is reduced considerably through matching for three of four groups, while the bias reduction for female unemployed in West Germany is below 50 percent. The main conclusions are:
• Locking-in effects are rather large for the group of individuals, who take up a subsidised job after a short-term training measure (Figure 3 ): Matched control persons find regular employment rather quickly and/or avoid unemployment directly after their training measure.
• Labour market outcomes of unemployed, who participated in a short-term training measure and received a wage subsidy ( Table 3 shows positive treatment effects -in the range of 14 to 31 percentage points -of a subsequent wage subsidy on the probability to be in regular (unsubsidised) employment three years after the start of the subsidy. But these effects are smaller than those found in Panel I of Table 1, which were not conditional on the participation in a short-term training measure.
• Panel II in Table 3 implies that a subsequent wage subsidy increases the probability to avoid unemployment in East Germany. However, for West Germany the analysis finds no additional significant effect of a wage subsidy on the avoidance of unemployment, if a shortterm training measure has already taken place.
One explanation might be that (rather cheap) short-term training measures within firms already have a favourable effect on the labour market possibilities of participants; the effect may sometimes be of such a size that a subsequent EGZ does not exert any additional impact. On the other hand, particularly individuals who were found less productive during their training period may have received a subsequent subsidy. 
Summary
We apply matching methods to estimate the average effect of targeted wage subsidies for hardto-place workers in Germany. Our results show that wage subsidies may increase the employment prospects of supported workers, compared to being never in any programme or participating only later, to a considerable amount. For previously unemployed individuals, three years after the start of the programme, the share in regular employment is 25 to 42 percent higher in the treatment group than in the matched comparison group. A comparison between groups of unemployed persons taking subsidised employment with matched comparison groups of individuals moving directly into unsubsidised employment indicates that differences in the employment prospects are rather small after three years. Finally, participation in short-term training measures goes hand in hand with better labour market prospects compared to the entire sample of unemployed. This may result, however, from the previous training as well as from the selection into these measures. As a consequence, the effect of subsidization on participants in a previous short-term training measure is more modest: The share in regular employment increases by 14 to 31 percentage points, if a short-term training measure is followed by a wage subsidy.
However, some points deserve further discussion. Comparing the estimated impacts in the first two scenarios, one may be tempted to doubt the effectiveness of subsidies: The comparison group in the second scenario is characterised by a comparable distribution of characteristics, but its members entered unsubsidized employment directly. So, was it really necessary to support those who actually got the subsidy? A simple answer would be that a large part of the subsidized jobs are just deadweight effects. Another explanation is that heterogeneity in the matches for workers with the same characteristics is responsible for these results. Thus, the same worker, who needs a subsidy to get one job, will be fully productive in another job. A line for future research of course is to gather more information on jobs (while we analysed the workers' side of the match only). The results of the third scenario -even if the estimated impact is positive -raise the question to what degree short training measures within firms might obtain results similar to an EGZ (at much lower costs). In addition to the previously raised argument of heterogeneity in the job matches, selectivity with respect to further EGZ support might occur, since employers learn about a participant's productivity during the training period. It is also plausible that case managers utilize short training measures in a kind of trial and error process. If a cheaper training measure suffices to integrate a previously unemployed person into a firm, than the more timeconsuming decision for or against an EGZ may readily be postponed. There is some evidence from case studies in selected agencies that short training measures in firms and the EGZ were sometimes seen as substitutes, thus the choice between them was rather an incidental matter (ZEW et al. 2006, 61) .
To conclude, our findings are in line with results from the literature; most studies that estimate effects of targeted wage subsidy programmes on the treated find positive effects on individual employment probabilities. For any assessment of the benefits of wage subsidies, it should be noted that the methods applied in this paper do not identify deadweight loss or potential displacement and substitution effects. In this sense Fay (1996) emphasises that careful controls are an important part of designing wage subsidy programmes. Otherwise, there is a risk that firms use schemes as a permanent subsidy to their workforce. Note: All estimated treatment effects are significant at = 0.05. Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, while long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. Small differences in the number of observations compared to Table B .1 result from the fact that each matched control person was assigned the date of the treatment start of his/her treated counterpart. If the matched control person was no longer unemployed on this date (which is the case for few observations, since we analyse only entries in a period of three months and also match on the duration of unemployment), the matched pair was dropped from further analysis. of the estimated propensity scores) can be observed for both participants and non-participants (Heckman et al. 1999) .
In this paper, we use nearest-neighbour matching with replacement and apply the STATAmodule psmatch2 (Sianesi/Leuven 2003) . The matching procedure chooses for each participant the non-participant with the most similar propensity score as a comparison person. Replacement implies that a non-participant can be used more than once in the matching procedure. Following (2), the programme impact is estimated as the mean difference in the outcomes of both groups.
To obtain an estimate for the variance of the estimator a formula suggested by Lechner (2001) is used, which accounts for the possible variance-inflating effect of the multiple uses of non- Note: Short-term subsidies are paid for 4 to 6 months, while long-term subsidies are paid for 7 to 12 months. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
